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CRIMINALIZING THE STATE 
François Tanguay-Renaud* 
A CHALLENGING THE ORTHODOXY 
When domestic criminal law theorists single out the state as a 
phenomenon in need of analytical examination, they typically single it out 
as agent of criminal law. That is to say, they tend to approach it as the 
quintessential maker, definer, promulgator, adjudicator, and enforcer of 
criminal law. Their working assumption is, characteristically, that a sound 
account of the nature and role of the state has much to teach us about what 
criminal law and criminal process are, as well as what they should be.1 
Interestingly, theorists rarely ponder the possibility that the state may also 
be an agent of crimes, whose conduct may itself be dealt with according to 
the criminal process. It is now almost half a century since Hannah Arendt 
called for scrutiny of this possibility when she claimed that abominable 
crimes such as those of Adolf Eichmann could only be committed “under 
a criminal law and by a criminal state” (1963: 240). No doubt, this 
assertion is provocative. Does it even make sense to think of states as 
possible criminals? Insofar as it does, can it ever be legitimate to treat 
them as such? State policies commonly described as atrocious crimes—
such “the Final Solution,” apartheid, or slavery—surely invite such 
queries. So do all-too-frequent state-sponsored acts of aggression, 
terrorism, torture, mass expropriations without just compensation, murder, 
or rape. Besides, if other socially prominent organizations such as private 
corporations can be treated as criminals, as they often are, why can’t states 
be? While a number of criminologists did heed Arendt’s call and engaged 
*Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, and Member of the Graduate Faculty of
the Philosophy Department at York University, Toronto. Special thanks are owed to 
Vincent Chiao, Antony Duff, John Gardner, Neha Jain, Dan Markel, Anthony ORourke, 
Zofia Stemplowska, and Victor Tadros for comments and discussions. I would also like 
to thank the participants in three seminars where this paper was presented, held at the 
University of Stirling (Criminalization Conference, September 2011), Osgoode Hall Law 
School (Nathanson Centre seminar, November 2011), and New York University Law 
School (NYU-BLS Criminal Law Theory Colloquium, January 2012). 
1 Many of Richard Dagger’s and Antony Duff’s recent writings, inspired by the 
republican tradition of thinking about the state, are prominent examples. See e.g. Dagger 
(2011) and Duff (2011). 
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in related inquiries, albeit through argumentative paths marred by 
conceptual confusions and theoretical unsophistication,2 remarkably few 
contemporary analytical philosophers of domestic criminal law have 
followed suit.  
Admittedly, in the last few years, some such philosophers have 
started to wrestle seriously with the thought that states, appropriately 
understood, may be the source of significant wrongdoing. Alice Ristroph 
(2011a), for example, argues that states are responsible for the criminal 
justice systems they generate, in the sense that they ought to take 
responsibility for them and may rightly be held to answer for their 
consequences, good and bad. Victor Tadros (2009) goes further and 
contends that a state may be complicit in the crimes of some of its 
inhabitants when it wrongfully contributes to the unjust creation of social 
conditions that make such crimes more likely. Still, such theorists’ gazes 
remain resolutely focused on the state qua agent of criminal law.3 
Generally, they seek to provide firm foundations for the claim that states 
must proactively and carefully scrutinize their criminal laws and processes 
to ensure their legitimacy. At times, they also endeavour to articulate 
reasons why the state should refrain from holding criminally responsible 
those whose crimes it bears at least partial responsibility for. Some also 
strive to build a compelling case for why states ought to take steps to 
mitigate the harms they occasion through their criminal justice systems 
and more general policies. The state may be a wrongdoer, they contend, 
but a criminal wrongdoer? While Ristroph recognizes the importance of 
evaluating state criminal justice systems and even contemplates the 
possibility of remedial compensation for harms caused by state penal 
policies, she generally avoids talk of state blame, prosecution, and 
punishment (2011a: 118, 124). Insofar as she does consider this latter 
possibility, she remains deeply sceptical of its suitability.4 Tadros is more 
2 Amongst the core problems plaguing these criminological discussions is their tendency 
to speak of crimes perpetrated by the state in the same breath as distinct forms of 
individual illegality and misconduct that are only loosely related to the state, yet happen 
to have some ‘political’ component or connection. Many also carelessly resort to the label 
of ‘state crime’ to refer to conduct that is not in fact illegal. Finally, criminologists 
generally omit any discussion of what submitting the state to the criminal process might 
entail. See e.g. Tilly (1985), Ross (2000), Green and Ward (2004). 
3 The same can be said of most others who pursue similar lines of argument, such as 
Ashworth (2003) and Berger (2012). 
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liberal in his use of language, to the point of describing some instances of 
state complicity in individual crimes as cases in which the state “should be 
regarded as a co-defendant.” Yet, he, too, insists that this analogy is no 
more than a “legal metaphor” (Tadros 2009: 400).  
It is only by looking back further in history that one comes to 
appreciate how deep-rooted the philosophical reluctance to admit the 
possibility of domestic state criminalization really is. In their own ways, 
Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, Hans Kelsen, Joel Feinberg, and Dennis 
Thompson all argued against it. No doubt, the prima facie appeal of many 
of the claims on which they rest their conclusion at least partly explains 
why it has come to represent such an unquestioned orthodoxy. But is this 
orthodoxy really as incontrovertible as most now seem to think? I have 
always doubted it and, in this article, I pose the question candidly. I 
proceed by identifying what I take to be the core objections to the 
criminalization of states—that is to say, objections to the condemnation 
(censure, blame) and punishment of the state, as a result of a suitably 
‘criminal’ process of public accountability, for the culpable (or 
blameworthy) perpetration of legal wrongs. I then investigate ways in 
which these objections can be challenged.  
For greater certainty, my focus in this article is not on the proper 
scope and contours of state crimes, either in general or as a specific 
category of legal thought. I say little about this issue—about which I 
reserve further arguments for another day—beyond assuming that certain 
legal wrongs are best characterized as crimes, and suggesting ways in 
which some state legal wrongdoing may already be recognized or treated 
as criminal. My focus here is on the contemporary practice of 
criminalization—as I have characterized it above in terms of what I take to 
be its distinctive elements—and on the intelligibility and legitimacy of its 
applicability to the state. Moreover, it is on the possibility of domestic 
state criminalization that I concentrate, even though, where instructive, I 
occasionally compare or contrast it with the possibility of international 
state criminalization. I opt for this focus given the lesser theoretical 
resistance to the prospect of international state criminalization,5 and since 
4 See e.g.  Ristroph (2011b: 686), where she speculates that since “the state is not much 
like a person,” it “cannot be regulated according to the same legal models that we use for 
private individuals.” 
5 See especially Luban (2011). Less resistance does not mean none. See e.g. Kant (1997, 
p. 117) and Koskenniemi (2002).
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the core objections to it find close analogues in the wider set of objections 
to the domestic case.  
The first, commonly-encountered, objection to domestic state 
criminalization is that the state is not a kind of entity that can intelligibly 
perpetrate criminal, qua legal, wrongs. In section B, I argue against this 
ground of scepticism by building upon an account of the modern state 
according to which it may be a moral agent proper, capable of both 
culpable moral and legal wrongdoing. I then move on, in section C, to 
consider a set of objections to the intelligibility and legitimacy of 
subjecting states to domestic criminal processes. These objections 
primarily find their source in the assumption that such subjection would 
necessarily involve the state prosecuting, judging, and punishing itself. I 
argue that whether this (questionable) assumption is sound or not, it does 
not create the kinds of unsolvable quandaries its exponents think it does. I 
then seek to address the distinct, yet related, objection that, at least in 
aspiring liberal jurisdictions (domestic or international), treating the state 
as a criminal objectionably involves extending to it various substantive 
and procedural guarantees that, given its nature and raison d’être, it 
should not have. Finally, in Section D, I discuss three central objections to 
punishing the state. First, that organizations like states do not have the 
phenomenal consciousness required to suffer punishment. Second, that the 
constant possibility of dispersion of state punishment amongst individual 
state members stands in the way of its justification. And lastly, that 
whatever justification there may be for making things harder for the state 
in response to its culpable wrongdoing, such treatment need not be 
understood as punishment. While partially conceding the strength of these 
objections, I strive to loosen their grip in ways that show that justified 
punishment of the state, meaningfully understood as such, remains a 
distinct possibility.  
I conclude by contrasting supposed alternatives to the 
criminalization of states, and by asking what my analysis ultimately leaves 
us with. I contend that it leaves us with enough to keep the possibility of 
domestic and international state criminalization on the table as a justifiable 
response to state wrongdoing—even if doing so compels us to revisit some 
of our usual assumptions about what is required for justified (individual) 
criminalization. I also suggest that thinking of the state as a possible 
5 
criminal or, more broadly, as a possible wrongdoer opens up interesting 
new vistas for criminal law theory in general.  
Given the potential implications of such an inquiry for law and 
policy-making, my motivations for engaging in it extend beyond the 
obvious need for philosophical demystification. Indeed, I start with 
Arendt’s intuition that, qua complex organizations channelling the energy 
of large numbers of individuals, modern states and their institutions can 
sometimes facilitate, enable, and program for serious wrongdoing, in ways 
that are irreducible—or incompletely reducible—to individual criminality. 
Some domestic legal systems seem to recognize this possibility to a degree 
when they allow, at least on the books, for the criminal prosecution of core 
state organs—such as “government or governmental instrumentalities,” 
“governmental entities,” “public bodies,” or “public agencies”—over and 
above the prosecution of their individual members and officials.6 While 
constitutional law is not usually analogized to criminal law,7 state 
wrongdoing is also regularly condemned under bills of rights and, on 
occasion, even judicially punished. Thus, under s. 24(1) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, punitive damages are sometimes deemed 
an “appropriate and just remedy” for egregious violations of rights 
resulting from state action.8 In international law circles, the 
criminalization of states, quite apart from that of their individual officials, 
6 See e.g. Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c. C-46, at ss. 2, 22.1, 22.2; Indiana 
Code Ann., at s. 35-41-1-22 (Burns 2004); New York Penal Law, at s. 10.00(7) 
(McKinney 2004). For a helpful historical survey of the criminalization of governmental 
bodies in the United States, alongside an argument for its expansion, see Green (1994). 
Compare: Code pénal (France), at s. 121-2, which explicitly exclude the state from the 
ambit of the criminal law, and the court cases reaching the same conclusion in the 
Netherlands (Roel de Lange 2002: s. 7).   
7 There are exceptions. See e.g. Steiker (1996: 2470), who describes constitutional 
criminal procedure guarantees as “a species of substantive criminal law for cops.” See 
also 18 U.S.C. § 242, which makes it a statutory crime in the United States to deprive a 
person of her constitutional rights. 
8 See e.g. Crossman v. The Queen, (1984) 9 DLR (4th) 588 (Federal Court, Trial 
Division); Patenaude v. Roy (1988), 46 CCLT 173 (Superior Court of Quebec); Freeman 
v. West Vancouver (District) (1991), 24 ACWS (3d) 936 (Supreme Court of British
Columbia). More generally, see Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of 
Education), 2003 SCC 62, par. 87, where the Supreme Court of Canada establishes that 
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has also often been contemplated. In fact, “international crimes of states” 
remained present in all but the final drafts of the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, which explicitly listed 
wrongs such as aggression, slavery, genocide, apartheid, and “massive 
pollution of the atmosphere or the seas” as state crimes (Crawford 2001: 
352-353).9 While the category was ultimately dropped, it continues to 
hover, albeit indirectly, in the background of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which makes it the case that individual 
crimes against humanity must be perpetrated “pursuant to or in furtherance 
of a State or organizational policy.”10 Thus, the idea that states may 
perpetrate criminal wrongs, and may be treated as criminals, already has 
some currency in the law and amongst lawmakers. My hope is that this 
project will contribute to future policy deliberations about it.   
 
Finally, it bears repeating that my object of inquiry is not the 
criminalization of state officials in their personal capacity. It is true that 
some individual crimes are linked to the state in the sense that only 
individuals occupying certain official roles can perpetrate them—think of 
corruption offenses, offenses involving the disclosure of information 
obtained in the course of state employment, or offenses of desertion. 
However, these crimes remain the crimes of individuals. That is, they are 
crimes for which individuals are publicly called to account, condemned, 
and punished in their own name. My focus is on the more controversial 
possibility of treating the state itself as a criminal. 
 
                                                 
9 See also Article 9 of the Nuremberg Charter which, although ultimately dispensed with 
by the Tribunal, could have served to condemn and punish the German state and relevant 
state institutions: “At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the 
Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be 
convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a 
criminal organization.” Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 
1945, Art. 9, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 UNTS 279.  
 
10 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Art. 7(2)(a), UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9* <www.un.org/icc>, reprinted in 37 ILM 999 (1998). The newly defined 
individual international crime of aggression also explicitly requires high level individual 
involvement with “the use of armed force by a State” in ways inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations. See Resolution RC/Res.6, Review Conference of the 
Rome Statute, Annex I on the Crime of Aggression <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf>. At the time of writing, only 




B IS STATE CRIMINAL WRONGDOING INTELLIGIBLE? 
 
For many who are used to considering and referring to the state as a 
discrete social actor, the suggestion that it cannot intelligibly commit 
crimes—that is, breaches of legal duties (aka legal wrongs) of a criminal 
nature—may seem somewhat puzzling. Surely, states are made up of, and 
act through, human beings who, themselves, can perpetrate crimes. If that 
is true, why can’t a state at least sometimes be understood as a criminal, if 
only by association with or as an accessory to such crimes?  
 
One oft-encountered suggestion is that, for the decisions and 
actions of individuals occupying roles in the architecture of the state—that 
is, officials—to be attributable to the state itself, they must be made, and 
carried out, for a ‘public’ purpose. Otherwise, the argument goes, the 
decisions and actions are only attributable to these individuals personally: 
they are ‘private’ and not the doing of the state. This idea is given various 
interpretations. For some, public action on the part of officials is action 
taken in furtherance of the interests of society as a whole, rather than in 
furtherance of the officials’ self-interest, or the interests of any particular 
individual or group. Least controversially public under this description is 
the provision of certain “public goods” that cannot as effectively be 
provided to some without being provided to all. Commonly-cited 
examples include social order, protection, safety, trust, as well as various 
other basic conditions of societal cooperation. Theorists in the Kantian 
tradition speak in more definitive terms. They speak of public action as 
action taken for the creation or sustenance of a “civil condition,” in which 
relevant public goods and private rights are sufficiently secured that 
citizens can rule themselves, through the legal apparatus of the state, as 
independent moral equals. The temptation for some of these theorists has 
been to hold that state qua public action, understood in such an abstract 
unitary way, is inherently morally permissible. The civil condition is 
elevated to the level of absolute and universal moral aim, such that any 
action by officials taken in its furtherance can yield no wrongs.11 
 
One should not succumb to this temptation. Kant himself 
recognizes that every existing state is morally imperfect, and may commit 
                                                 
11 For recent examples of criminal law theorists tempted by, yet stopping short of fully 
endorsing, this line of argument, see Thorburn (2012: 11-12), as well as  Dorfman and 
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wrongful excesses and injustices, some of which may be quite extreme. 
This concession should come as no surprise since the civil condition, just 
like the broader idea of action in the interests of society as a whole, 
constitutes no more than a normative ideal for the state, in the purported 
furtherance of which acts of varying moral quality may be carried out. 
Some such acts may be sloppily executed, unjust, excessively coercive, 
oppressive, or otherwise in dereliction of some of the state’s duties to its 
citizens or others. Therefore, irrespective of what one thinks of Kant’s 
actual articulation of the civil condition as a moral benchmark for the 
state, and of the thought that an ideal state operating in an ideal world 
could do no wrong, genuine acts of existing states will sometimes “fail the 
tests of critical morality” in ways that amount to moral wrongdoing 
(Ripstein 2009: 325-343, 348). The same can no doubt also be said of acts 
in the “interests of society as a whole” which may, at times, rest on 
morally wrongful trade-offs, inflictions of harm, and so on. This point 
about the possibility of state moral wrongdoing is important, since the 
criminal law is commonly thought to recognize, specify, and sometimes 
even create, genuine moral wrongs.  
 
Unfortunately, our troubles do not end here, at least at the level of 
domestic law. Some, like Thomas Hobbes, argue that even if the state can 
act immorally, it cannot violate the (domestic) law because it itself is the 
(domestic) law. In other words, a state and its domestic legal system are 
one and the same entity, such that states cannot intelligibly contravene 
their domestic law (Hobbes 1996: 150, 215).12 Therefore, the objection 
goes, even if engaged in from a genuinely ‘public’ point of view, any act 
that violates domestic criminal law cannot intelligibly be an act of the 
state. In previous work, to which I refer the reader, I have sought to refute 
this objection (Tanguay-Renaud 2010). In brief, though, it seems clear that 
there is more to the state than law. For one thing, social rules such as the 
ones making up legal systems or states’ constitutions are all subject to 
change over time. Thus, when considered diachronically, they must 
inevitably be understood as a sequence of sets of rules. We think of this 
sequence of sets as unified only because the ongoing group of human 
beings to which it belongs accepts it (perhaps along with some relevant 
external actors) as an efficacious and continuous unit. It is undeniable that 
                                                 
12 This objection has most recently been associated with the work of Hans Kelsen (2006: 
181-207). Kantians are less prone to making this objection since the idea of an entity that 
creates the law and then departs from it is, in a sense, central to their philosophy. We are 




law plays a central role in constituting the state, but as this argument 
suggests, so do the social and political recognition as well as engagement 
of relevant actors. It is this socio-political dimension that accounts, for 
example, for the fact that we do not think of most violations of a state’s 
constitutional law—both small and more extreme, including many coups 
and other kinds of substantial unconstitutional reorganizations—as 
undermining the state’s continuity. It also explains why such violations are 
unnecessary for a state to become distinct from another—as in the case of 
Canada, whose constitution remains, to this day, continuous with laws of 
the British Parliament.  
 
Note that what I have just said should not be interpreted to mean 
that, insofar as states are structured and bounded by rules, these rules are 
necessarily legal rules. Non-legal socio-political conventions also play a 
central role in constituting and empowering state action. If the Australian 
Prime Minister can apologize on behalf of the state of Australia for its 
treatment of aboriginal people, without any legal rule empowering this 
action, and if the British Prime Minister can declare war on behalf of the 
state while, legally, this power is held by the Monarch, it is because of a 
widespread social recognition of these Prime Ministers’ constitutional 
capacity to do such things. This reasoning may also extend to less 
obviously ‘constitutional’ offices. Nick Barber articulates the claim in the 
following way: 
 
The legal rules which regulate the police force might hold that an 
officer who harasses innocent folk steps outside of the area of her 
office and acts as a private citizen. The community in which the 
police officer works, in contrast, may regard the harassment as an 
act of the police: it is the police as an institution who have 
undertaken this action, through the medium of the particular officer 
(2010: 113). 
 
For Barber, then, extralegal actions such as police harassment and, 
presumably, even more serious forms of legal wrongdoing—such as 
murder or sexual assault—may intelligibly be undertaken on the state’s 
behalf, insofar as the state is understood in both legal and socio-political 
terms. Of course, it is a further question whether courts, qua state organs 
mandated to apply the law, ought to recognize such extralegal dimensions 
of the state. I will come back in the next section to the normative position 
of courts vis-à-vis the rest of the state. The point here is solely about the 
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intelligibility of state domestic legal wrongdoing, quite independently of 
the appropriateness of its judicial acknowledgment.  
 
 I insist on ‘state’ legal wrongdoing to reflect the context of 
Barber’s discussion. Yet, notice that, in the passage quoted above, Barber 
singles out an intermediate actor as wrongdoer—namely, the police as an 
institution. Assertions about governmental and administrative institutions 
are often made in passing in discussions about state legal responsibility.13 
Yet, they give rise to a number of important questions about what it is that 
links these institutions to the state, and how they, like the state considered 
as a whole, may be said to be wrongdoers in their own right. Of course, 
such institutions, just like the state as a whole, may be treated, by means 
of moral or legal fictions, as if they were state wrongdoers. However, 
Barber seems to have a deeper and more complex sense of institutional 
wrongdoing in mind, and I believe he is on to something important. 
 
 As Christian List and Philip Pettit (2011) argue, a stringent case 
can plausibly be made that at least some organized groups—let’s call them 
corporate organizations—are fit to be held responsible and blamed in the 
same way as individual wrongdoers. Primarily, they are fit to be held 
responsible and blamed for wrongdoing, including criminal wrongdoing, 
which they, as agents, planned or programmed. While I cannot get into the 
minute details of the account here, one of its great strengths is that it rests 
on the non-mysterious premise that organizations derive all their matter 
and energy from their individual members. It is through their members 
that organizations can access evidence and gain the understanding 
required for making evaluative judgments about the reasons for action 
(including moral and legal reasons) and normative options that they face 
qua corporate agents. It is also through the intercession of individual 
members that organizations can ultimately implement their corporate 
judgments, and act in the world qua corporate agents. I say ‘qua corporate 
agents’ because, as List and Pettit emphasize, to count as agents that are 
independently fit to be held responsible for their own wrongdoing, 
organizations must also be irreducible to their members in a salient way. 
 
                                                 
13 Hobbes himself speaks of some acts of representative assemblies and other body 
politics as crimes that may be punished (1996: 150). Malcolm Thorburn, who otherwise 
resists the idea of state wrongdoing on allegedly Kantian lines, also speaks of the 
possibility of “crown liability,” over and above the tortious and criminal liability that a 




 The basic thought is that some organized groups of interacting 
human beings can be conversable agents. That is, they can be constituted 
in ways that make it possible to do business with them over time qua 
groups—for example, by entering into treaties or contracts with them, 
reasonably expecting that these will be honoured. For such group 
conversability to be possible, the group needs, of course, to be responsive 
to the attitudes and in-puts of its individual members. Yet, it must also be 
responsive in a way that ensures a minimum of group consistency, 
coherence, and sensitivity to reason over time. According to List and 
Pettit, these features can obtain when the group functions in keeping with 
an adequate normative framework, or constitution. A constitution is 
adequate in this sense, when it ensures that reason is “collectivized,” such 
that the organized group’s judgments, beliefs, action-directing attitudes, as 
well as action plans are, on the whole, functionally independent, as 
opposed to a mere reflection, of the corresponding judgments, attitudes, 
and plans of the members. Autocratic decision procedures, according to 
which all decisions are merely those of an individual dictator and no real 
group decisions are taken, are clearly inadequate. In such cases, there is no 
conversable group agent—only the dictator himself or herself. Simple 
majoritarianism is also inadequate, since group decisions are then 
reducible to the decisions of those individuals in the majority. What the 
constitution must ensure, List and Pettit argue, is the group’s relative 
autonomy, in the sense of enabling it to form judgments, attitudes, and 
plans that cannot fully be reduced to those of group members and, as a 
result, are not, on the whole, hostage to their idiosyncracies.14 A process 
must also be in place, they hasten to add, to ensure that the group can 
correct its judgments and attitudes over time, thus enabling it to exhibit the 
minimal, yet genuine rational consistency that we expect from agents 
proper.  
 
The overall contention, then, is that, by jointly committing and 
adhering to such a constitution, an organization’s members can generate a 
single, relatively autonomous corporate agent which, when faced with 
normatively significant choices, is capable of making irreducible 
judgments about what is good and bad, right and wrong. This corporate 
                                                 
14 They envisage a number of ways in which such propositional irreducibility can be 
ensured, including various premise aggregation decision procedures and more complex 
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agent, which in an important sense has a mind of its own, may then make 
decisions and plan for action in an irreducible way, and may do so in ways 
that exhibit the types of mens rea attitudes that are deemed so central to 
modern criminal culpability—namely, intention, recklessness, negligence, 
and the like. Moreover, it may control for the performance of such action 
by arranging things so that some individuals are directed, or empowered, 
to perform relevant tasks, while others are identified as possible back-ups. 
As List and Pettit argue, a corporate agent that arranges for criminal 
wrongdoing in this way is fit to be held responsible and blamed as the 
“source of the deed,” or the “planner” at its origin (2011: ch. 7). Of course, 
the individuals who give life to such an agent have to answer for what they 
do in making corporate agency possible. They remain agents, and possible 
wrongdoers, in their own right. However, the entity they maintain also has 
to answer as a whole for what it does at the corporate level, while making 
use of the resources provided by its various members. 
 
 As complex organizations that deal with their members and with 
other states across time and political regimes, modern states are prime 
candidates for long-lasting irreducible corporate agency. Their 
constitutions typically include goals and principles of governance, institute 
multilayered decision-making procedures, and impose the kinds of 
balances and checks necessary to foster relative organizational autonomy 
and sufficient rational consistency over time. Common examples of 
relevant decisional constraints include: the separation of powers between 
the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary, bicameral legislatures, 
federal divisions of powers, judicial review of administrative and 
legislative action, stare decisis, elections, conventions of ministerial and 
cabinet responsibility, impeachment procedures, and the like. No doubt, 
states depend on their individual members to make decisions and act, but 
by committing and adhering to their state’s constitutional framework to a 
reasonable extent, such individuals can also bring about irreducible state 
agency.    
 
An objection might here be raised that states really act through 
their executives or other governmental organs and that, insofar as these 
organs are constituted in ways that meet the conditions of irreducible 
agency, they are the potential wrongdoers on which we ought to 
concentrate our attention. Such a move would, no doubt, explain Barber’s 
focus on the police as an institution. It would also resonate with the 
explicit mention of governments, governmental agencies, public and 
administrative bodies, and municipalities as potential criminal wrongdoers 
13 
 
in domestic criminal codes. However, this move would unacceptably 
disregard the very real possibility of culpable moral and legal wrongdoing 
by the overall group agent contemplated by most national constitutions 
and usually internationally recognized as such—that is, the state as a 
whole. At the domestic level, consider the case of a state’s parliament or 
congress enacting harmful laws that egregiously violate some individuals’ 
constitutional rights, which are then enforced by the executive, garner the 
acquiescence of a large part of the population and are judicially upheld, at 
least in lower courts. At the international level, think of the declaration 
and waging of an unjust and illegal war by a state which, as whole, 
endorses this course of action. A significant point in respect of such 
scenarios is that even when some or all of a state’s relevant subparts are 
not responsible agents due to constitutive deficiencies, even when their 
wrongs are excused because of, say, understandable epistemic limitations, 
or even when their distinctive behaviour does not amount to a given 
wrong, the state as a whole may still be fit to be held responsible and 
blamed for that wrong qua corporate agent.15 
 
 Of course, recognizing that corporate agents may nest within one 
another is important, just as it is important to recognize that individual 
agents necessarily nest within corporate agents. Moreover, it is important 
to appreciate that nested corporate agents may be wrongdoers in their own 
right. However, such recognition should not obscure the fact that the state 
as a whole may also be constituted as a responsible agent capable of 
wrongdoing—an agent with its own constitution, goals, commitments, 
attitudes, and plans, which its executive and other subsidiary organs need 
not share. To be sure, subsidiary corporate state organs may, like 
individual members, partake in the formation of their state’s irreducible 
beliefs, action-directing attitudes, and plans. For example, in both British-
style parliamentarianism and U.S.-style separation of powers, the 
executive generally has a central role to play in the development and 
adoption of state policies, even if balances and checks often force it to 
modulate its interventions and, at times, may frustrate them altogether. 
Like individual state members, subsidiary corporate state organs may also 
play a role in the implementation of state policies. This role will often be 
                                                 
15 List and Pettit (2011: 165-167) emphasize the related possibility of shortfalls of 
individual responsibility as a key reason for holding corporate agents responsible for 
given harms and wrongs. This argument can easily be extended to include the possibility 
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central to the life of the state, even if it is only that of an intermediary as 
opposed to that of an ultimate implementer, and even when it is performed 
reluctantly. It may be performed reluctantly, I insist, or sometimes outright 
resisted, since states and their subsidiary organs may differ in their 
judgments, commitments, and goals. As a result, they may also differ in 
their wrongdoing, insofar as they perpetrate any.   
 
Still, one may ask, if states and their subsidiary agents, both 
corporate and individual, are best understood as distinct entities from an 
agency standpoint, how can we know whether the latter’s actions 
implicate the state? Would it not be easier to assume that the the complex 
agential web that I have just begun to uncover amounts to a single agent? 
For example, could we not speak of the politico-legal organization of a 
(territorially-demarcated) society’s governance or, for short, of “the 
government”? It would certainly be easier to think of ‘state action’ in such 
an undifferentiated way.16 Sometimes, courts may even be justified—on 
consequential, expressive, or fairness-based grounds—in fictionally 
treating the actions of subsidiary agents as if they had been performed on 
behalf of the state, when, in fact, they were not. Fictions of identification 
and vicarious responsibility are no stranger to the law. By definition, 
though, fictions are not reality, and their indiscriminate use may lead to 
the unjustified obliteration of important agential distinctions.17  
 
Fortunately, there is no need to resort to fiction in such a wholesale 
fashion. The actions of subsidiary agents implicate the state when the state 
either arranges for them, or fails to take sufficient measures to prevent 
them when it has a duty to do so. When such state behaviour amounts to 
criminal wrongdoing, even if only accessorial in nature, it can then 
intelligibly be singled out as such. To determine which actions the state 
arranges, one must scrutinize its decisions and plans. These are, by and 
large, contained in the rules through which the state intentionally directs 
subsidiary agents to act in specific ways, as well as in those in which it 
authorizes, perhaps recklessly or negligently, actions beyond the scope of 
what it intends. Scrutiny of such rules, as well as of the actual responses of 
                                                 
16 I have sometimes done it myself (Tanguay-Renaud 2009: 34). 
 
17 Compare: Veitch (2008: ch. 2), who argues that the state, understood in such an all-
encompassing way, facilitates the “dispersal” of responsibility by obscuring the 




the subsidiary agents they empower, can also provide important evidence 
of state inaction, where such action is required.  
 
Here, a few clarifications are warranted. First, when I loosely 
speak of rules, I speak of legal rules, but also, as I have done throughout, 
of relevant non-legal conventions, customs, policies, and practices. Of 
course, I also recognize that more particular commands and rulings may 
form part of the means through which states arrange for action. However, 
given the sheer size and range of actions of modern states and the 
associated need for generalizations, such particular means will tend to be 
secondary. Notice, secondly, that this approach to identifying state action 
also applies to the actions of other corporate agents. Thus, it also allows us 
to single out the actions of corporate state organs, which, as we have seen, 
may differ in their moral and legal quality from those of the state. Thirdly, 
actions that implicate the state need not be those of “state officials,” if by 
this expression one means to exclude “private” companies and ordinary 
individuals. Indeed, a state may well empower the latter to act for it, even 
if only temporarily and contractually. It may also fail to supervise them as 
it should.   
 
Finally, I am not denying that it will sometimes be debatable 
whether given individual actions implicate the state in one of the ways 
identified above. Neither am I denying that states and their subsidiary 
corporate organs may fail to meet the conditions of irreducible agency, 
either because of constitutional deficiencies or of their members’ lack of 
commitment. In such cases, legal fictions of state criminality might still be 
invoked. The question then becomes whether such fictions are justified 
and, in some scenarios, it might just be that they are. Consider, for 
example, situations in which fictions of state criminality would express 
valuable denunciation of harmful structural deficiencies, spur meaningful 
organizational reforms, provide optimal deterrence against future official 
misconduct, yet have virtually no unjust side-effects. No doubt, similar 
lines of argument could also be developed in relation to the state’s 
subsidiary corporate organs (see e.g. Cane 2002: 264-270). That being 
said, fictional criminalization remains at best a non-standard case of the 
practice which, at its core, is directed at wrongdoing agents. Accordingly, 
I will persist with my focus on the real agency paradigm when 
investigating the possibility of state criminalization, and leave the 
discussion of states (or subsidiary corporate state organs) that do not meet 
its conditions on a reasonably consistent basis for another occasion.  
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I am now in a position to sharpen some of my comments from the 
beginning of the section about where the state stands in relation to its 
purpose(s). The fact that state action boils down to corporate action makes 
clear that states can, qua states, perpetrate wrongs, including legal wrongs, 
even when they are not pursuing the public interest or, more broadly, 
when they are not acting legitimately. Once constituted as irreducible 
agents, states may, just like other corporate and individual agents, act in 
all sorts of ways and with all sorts of motivations that are wrongful. 
Indeed, there may be despotic, even tyrannical, states. Some might insist 
that a state that fails to pursue the interests or well-being of its individual 
members fails to meet a key moral standard of legitimacy that unavoidably 
applies to it given its nature and role in society. At a more conceptual 
level, some may also contend that a state must at least claim, however 
hypocritically, to be acting in the interests of its individual members if it is 
to count as a state. Notice, though, that even if these contentions are 
accurate, which they may well be, neither entails that a state must 
genuinely purport to act in furtherance of anyone’s interest to act and do 
wrong, even criminal wrong, as a state. 
 
Notice further that my account allows for different relationships 
between the state and its population. In some cases, states will be 
constituted in ways that make possible, encourage, and sometimes even 
require, the active participation of a large part of their population in their 
corporate life. In so-called liberal democratic states, for example, citizens 
will be able to vote, join political parties, run for elected office, make 
representations seeking to influence their state’s decisions and plans, and 
so forth. In some other cases, though, the bulk of the population may be 
confined to passive subservience to a state whose corporate energy is 
almost exclusively derived from a ruling elite.18 Now, while a state need 
not contain a broad popular base of active members, every state still 
requires a minimum of recognition and acquiescence from the bulk of its 
population if its constitutional structure is not to disintegrate into, or fail to 
rise from, anarchy. In fact, many theorists plausibly affirm that it is a mark 
of the modern state that it claims supreme authority—or sovereignty—to 
regulate people’s lives within its territory. For a state to exist, the 
argument often continues, this claim must be sufficiently successful de 
                                                 
18 John Rawls makes a related distinction when he contrasts “states, as traditionally 




facto (Barber 2010: 19-25; Philpott 2010; Green 1990: 25-28, 65-66, 78-
83). One prominent articulation of this traditional position is that of Max 
Weber (1991: 78), who argues, more specifically, that it is a mark of the 
state that it successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical force within a territory. Traces of this understanding can also be 
found in the works of Hobbes (1996: 207, 215) and Kant (1996: 104-110), 
for whom acts of domestic punishment are inherently acts of sovereign 
authority and are, therefore, the prerogative of the state. Such ways of 
thinking lie at the root of a series of further objections to state 
criminalization that I now seek to address. 
 
C HOW CAN THE STATE BE CRIMINALIZED? 
 
The criminal process is often theorized as a process through which 
criminal wrongdoers are called to account for their deeds (see e.g. Duff et 
al. 2007). Insofar as this view is correct, does it not pose a steep challenge 
for the possibility of criminalizing the state? That is, if the state is the kind 
of supreme, or sovereign, regulative authority that, at least in principle, 
may have the last word on everything within a territory, or at least 
successfully presents itself as such, who is to call it to account? This 
challenge is not conceptual insofar as the state, just like individuals, can 
intelligibly call itself to account and hold itself responsible for its 
wrongdoing. The real problem, I take it, is the problem of justice, or lack 
of appearance of justice, that may be associated with the state being judge 
in its own case.  
 
 Not everyone sees self-referential calling to account as 
problematic. According to Kant, for example, the sovereign state, which 
he otherwise presents as supreme legislator on behalf of the people, may 
sometimes depart from domestic law and then act as judge in its own case 
(1996: 95; Ripstein 2009: 330). In fact, Kant argues, the state is the only 
entity that has standing to judge and remedy its domestic illegalities, 
speaking, in so doing, in the name of the people and the law. The usual 
objection to this provocative suggestion is that such a self-referential 
process is likely to be rife with conflicts of interests and, therefore, to be 
irremediably biased (or at least appear to be). One response is that, despite 
being subject to pressures of their own including from wrongdoing states 
themselves, some international bodies may be sufficiently well-designed 
and insulated to be able to call states (or at least many of them) to 
account—by prosecuting and judging them—justly, and with appearance 
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of justice. This line of argument certainly has merit, but note that the idea 
of organizational independence on which it rests may also be advanced to 
a significant degree in the context of domestic adjudication.  
 
At the level of prosecution, independence can be meaningfully 
ensured by allowing “private prosecutions” led by victims of state 
wrongdoing and their counsel, possibly with the support of amicus curiae. 
In federal states, where not all prosecutorial state units are inappropriately 
implicated in wrongdoing, some relatively independent prosecutors may 
also be involved. At the adjudicative level, independence may be fostered 
through guarantees of tenure and remuneration for the judiciary, 
discerning methods of judicial appointment, stringent oaths of office, and 
other strict conditions of service imposed on judges. That is, constitutions 
often envisage bodies—namely, courts—that occupy a special, insulated 
position in the state’s architecture, in part to provide independent checks 
on state action (including state action involving lower courts). 
Consequently, we generally do not see any intractable problem in having 
the judiciary sit in judgment of the legal validity of state action in 
constitutional and administrative law contexts. The question then 
becomes: why would courts sitting in judgment of state criminal 
wrongdoing be any different? 
 
 According to one school of thought, constitutional and 
administrative law are primarily concerned with questions of legal 
validity, such that judges, who undertake to uphold the law in their oaths 
of office, can engage with related questions without overstepping the 
bounds of their jurisdiction. Yet, as I argued, the state is a socio-legal 
creature that can very well perpetrate legal wrongs while acting in legally 
invalid ways. Thus, judgments of state legal wrongdoing may require 
judges to recognize extralegal state action and, so the argument goes, to 
venture out of their jurisdiction inappropriately. In my view, such a line of 
reasoning endorses an exceedingly myopic understanding of the role of 
courts. As a general rule, judicial oaths of office do not demand mere 
fidelity to law. They require judges to apply the law and do justice.19 
                                                 
19 Consider the following examples of judicial oaths, which all more or less convey the 
same idea. In the United Kingdom: “I, [NAME], do swear by Almighty God that I will 
well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady Queen Elizabeth the Second in the office of 
[TITLE], and I will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of this 
realm, without fear or favour, affection or ill will. So help me God.” See online: 
<www.judiciary.gov.uk/about_judiciary/judges_and_the_constitution/index.htm>. The 
judicial oath for the High Court of Australia uses virtually the same words: High Court of 
19 
 
Appreciation of this dual character of the judicial role is important. 
Despite the common popular assumption that justice and law go hand-in-
hand, and that it is always possible for judges to do justice according to 
law, nothing could be further from the truth. There is nothing in law or in 
its application that is necessarily just.20 Thus, in many jurisdictions, judges 
have found ways to address state legal wrongdoing perpetrated through 
legally invalid action, in the name of justice. Consider, for example, the 
numerous judicial doctrines developed to compel states and subsidiary 
state agents to make good on all sorts of legitimate expectations that their 
legally invalid actions create amongst those who reasonably rely on 
them.21 Think also of the numerous cases in which courts depart sharply 
                                                                                                                         
Australia Act 1979 (Commonwealth of Australia). In Finland: “I, [NAME], do promise 
and swear by God and His Holy Gospels that to the best of my understanding and 
conscience I wish to and shall in all judgments render justice to poor and rich alike and 
render judgment in accordance with the laws and lawful rules of God and country: I shall 
never, under any pretext, pervert the law nor promote injustice because of kinship, 
relationship, friendship, envy, hatred or fear, or for the sake of gifts or presents or other 
reasons, nor shall I find an innocent person guilty or a guilty person innocent. 
Furthermore, I shall not, before pronouncing a judgment or thereafter, reveal to the 
parties or to anyone else anything about the deliberations that the Court has held behind 
closed doors. All of this I wish to and shall fulfil faithfully, honestly and as an earnest 
judge, without deceit and intrigue, so help me God, in body and mind.” For this 
translation of the Code of Judicial Procedure (4/1734) (Finland) s 7, see online: 
<www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1734/ en1734 0004.pdf>. In the United States, federal 
judges must take the following oath: “I, [NAME], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I 
will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to 
the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties 
incumbent upon me as [TITLE] under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So 
help me God.” 28 USC 453. Of course, I am not claiming here that oaths of office are the 
only source of judges’ duties to uphold the law and do justice. 
 
20 Although I cannot present a fully-articulated defense of this view here, I refer the 
reader to Green (2010).  
 
21  One good illustration is the “de facto doctrine” invoked by the Supreme Court of 
Canada to recognize and give limited effect to the “justified expectations of those who 
have relied upon [...] actions performed pursuant to invalid Acts of the Manitoba 
Legislature by public and private bodies corporate, courts, judges, persons exercising 
statutory powers and public officials.” Re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 S.C.R. 
721, par. 79-80. Think also of the cases of officially-induced mistake of law, in which a 
criminal defendant has reasonably based her conduct on a view of the law, implanted by a 
governmental official, that turns out to be erroneous. In such cases, many legal systems 
recognize a defense of “officially-induced error” or are prepared to stay the prosecution 
on grounds of abuse of process. On this issue see Ashworth (2003: 302-322). Consider 
finally the various doctrines of substantive legitimate expectation and issue-estoppel that 
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from their legally-circumscribed jurisdiction to affirm the continuity of 
states in the face of revolutions (see e.g. Mahmud 1994; Barber 2000), or 
to give effect to previously non-legal constitutional conventions.22 I am 
not denying that, as primary law-applying institutions, courts play a 
central role in upholding the ideal of rule of law, according to which both 
states and individuals ought to be held accountable for their illegalities. 
Notice, however, that in the case of state criminal wrongdoing, such 
accountability may demand from judges that they recognize some of the 
state’s extralegal, or legally invalid, instantiations. My point is that, given 
their relatively insulated posture, domestic courts may be able, and well-
placed, to hold the state to account for extralegal criminal wrongdoing. 
This may be so even if, as some argue, such paradoxical enforcement of 
the rule of law through recognition of extralegality pushes judges to act at 
the edge of, if not cross, the usual parameters of their role within the 
architecture of the state. 
 
 Now, the inherent bias (or possibility of bias) objection to state 
criminalization is usually not only aimed at the calling and holding to 
account parts of the criminal process. It typically also targets the way in 
which types of behaviour are legally specified as crimes. Indeed, if states 
are supreme authorities, or sovereigns, within their territory, or at least 
successfully present themselves as such, may they not simply legislate 
themselves out of domestic criminal jeopardy? This objection, of 
Hobbesian lineage, does not directly apply to subsidiary state organs that 
are sufficiently removed from the legislative process. However, it 
certainly poses an important challenge for the possibility of criminalizing 
the state as a whole. Moreover, insofar as the state seeks to immunize its 
subsidiary organs from the criminal process, the objection may also 
indirectly apply to them. Here, one should perhaps not entirely disregard 
the possibility of enlightened states choosing to bind themselves 
anticipatorily through criminal legislation, and to subject themselves 
resolutely to the consequences. After all, much of existing international 
law—perhaps outside its debated core of jus cogens—is based on such a 
model of voluntary state submission. Many contemporary theoretical 
defences of criminal punishment also rest on the idea of the criminal 
                                                                                                                         
are currently being developed and extended in many jurisdictions in the administrative 
law context. 
 
22  See e.g. R. v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame (No 2), [1991] 1 




(ideally) assenting to, if not willing, his own punishment.23 Still, states 
may not be so upstanding, and be tempted to manipulate legislation in 
their favour. Even then, I do not think the objection is fatal. 
 
While they are typically not conceived as comprising criminal 
prohibitions, state constitutions often enshrine legal duties whose breach 
by the state may be judicially condemned and, in some jurisdictions,  
punitively sanctioned. In other words, constitutions may intelligibly 
entrench state crimes. One could think along such lines of common bills of 
rights prohibitions on torture and other cruel and unusual treatment of 
individuals, of duties not to deprive people of their life, integrity, or liberty 
without a constitutionally recognized justification, or of duties not to strip 
individuals of their property without appropriate compensation. The fact 
that we typically do not think of state violations of such constitutional 
duties as criminal, just as we do not tend to think of state violations of 
international human rights treaties as international state crimes, probably 
largely has to do with the remedies, not obviously punitive, that are 
typically available for them. Here, I am referring to common remedies 
such as legal invalidity, non-punitive compensatory damages, apologies, 
and the like. Still, states may conceivably be called to account and 
condemned judicially for such legal wrongdoing and, in many 
jurisdictions, they are. Insofar as state punishment is a constitutionally 
available remedy and is ever legitimate, we may then be able to think in 
terms of constitutional crimes of state. Since constitutions are generally 
much more difficult to amend than criminal statutes or precedents, 
entrenchment of state crimes in them may then assure that states cannot 
modify them at whim. Similar entrenchment could possibly also happen at 
the level of international law, by devising processes that make it difficult 
for states to retreat from prior treaty commitments or customs 
acknowledged to establish international crimes of state.  
 
 Going back to domestic courts and accountability for a moment, a 
further objection may be that, as insulated from the rest of the state as it 
may be, the judiciary (up to its highest echelon) may itself be involved in 
state legal wrongdoing. Consider again the case of a state’s parliament or 
                                                 
23 For example, Jacob Adler (1992) argues that the “conscientious paradigm” of the 
criminal who seeks and undertakes her own punishment is the central paradigm of 
justified punishment. For the more nuanced claim that the criminal should (ideally) be a 
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congress that enacts harmful laws that egregiously violate some 
individuals’ basic constitutional rights, which are then enforced by the 
executive and, this time, emphatically upheld by the court of final 
appeal.24 Insofar as arguments grounded in hypocrisy and complicity then 
defeat the judiciary’s standing to turn around and call the state to account 
for such wrongdoing, would unaccountability have to prevail? Again, an 
argument may be made that appropriately constituted and sufficiently 
independent international bodies could be well placed, and have the 
required standing, to call the state to account. Still, no state has ever been 
internationally tried for crimes and, as I hinted in the first section, the 
drive to create suitable organizational and legal frameworks for so doing 
seems to have lost much of its momentum.25 Admittedly, some United 
Nations and more regional bodies have been set up to document and call 
states to account for significant human rights violations. At times, they 
even blame states for their wrongdoing and call for redress. Yet, many of 
these interventions go unheeded and, perhaps excepting some infrequent 
and rather unpredictable Security Council responses, fall well short of the 
punitive quality that is thought to be so central to the criminal process. 
 
 What about the population of wrongdoing states—that is, those in 
whose names and behalf states typically claim to act—or, at least, that part 
of the population actually victimized by a state’s wrongdoing? Could such 
individuals not seek to call the state to account, condemn it and, possibly, 
punish it? The suggestion is challenging. Whereas legitimate and 
successful calls for accountability and condemnations may conceivably be 
made in “the court of public opinion,” criminal law theorists generally 
stand firm against the idea of people taking the law into their own hands to 
punish wrongdoers.26 Yet, this possibility should perhaps not be rejected 
                                                 
24 Beyond obvious examples emanating from corrupt states like Nazi Germany and 
Apartheid South Africa, numerous less widespread, yet no less holistic state excesses 
easily come to mind—say, those committed in response to alleged “national security” 
threats. See e.g. the oft-criticized case of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944), upholding the internment of innocent Japanese Americans during World War II. 
 
25 The International Court of Justice did consider many relevant issues in the recent 
Bosnia v. Serbia case, in which Bosnia accused Serbia of violating its obligations under 
the Convention against Genocide. Yet, the case was “civil,” and primarily concerned with 
the question of compensatory damages. Case Concerning the Application of the 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. 
Serbia & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. General List No. 91 (Judgment of February 26).  
 
26 There are sophisticated exceptions, such Husak (1990).  
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too quickly. For example, Article 20 of the German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz) provides that all Germans may resist those seeking to 
abolish Germany’s constitutional order, if no other remedy is available. In 
its Preamble, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights also 
recognizes that popular rebellion can be a remedy of last resort against 
tyranny and oppression. Could such recognitions be interpreted as pointing 
to at least some legal latitude for individuals to punish the state, in the 
sense of intentionally inflicting hard treatment on it for legal 
wrongdoing?27 
 
 Some may try to resist this suggestion by arguing that punishment 
is, by definition, a purported exercise of authority. I have always been 
sceptical of this conceptual claim. Ordinary individuals regularly punish 
their friends, colleagues, and partners for actual or supposed wrongdoing, 
in ways capable of inflicting significant suffering on them. Yet, even if, 
somehow, it is true that an act must be an exercise of purported authority 
to count as punishment, nothing conceptually precludes individuals from 
claiming, however timidly, the authority to punish their wrongdoing state. 
Therefore, if insuperable problem there is with ordinary individuals 
punishing the state, it is not conceptual in nature. A related, yet stronger, 
argument is that legitimate criminal punishment must be an act of 
sovereign authority. That is, if, as Weber contended, states successfully 
claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a territory, there 
may simply be no accommodation possible for punishments by ordinary 
individuals. I have argued elsewhere that this interpretation of Weber’s 
position is too strong, and that a state could not possibly claim to 
monopolize all legitimate uses of force including, for example, all 
individual instances of defensive force (Tanguay-Renaud 2012: 39-40). 
What a state is more likely to claim, as part of its claim to supreme 
authority, is a monopoly on the authoritative determination of the 
permissibility of uses of force. Such a claim is far less problematic for the 
possibility of individual punishment of the state. It makes it conceivable 
that a state may permit ordinary individuals to resort to force or other 
                                                                                                                         
 
27 Such interpretation is suggested by theorists, like Tony Honoré, who argue that forceful 
resistance or rebellion against the state is only permissible “when a wrong has been 
committed” (1988: 38). The right to rebel, Honoré goes on to say, is “the ultimate 
sanction for the violation of other rights” (41). John Locke also speaks about permissible 
individual uses of force in resistance against “unjust and unlawful force” by the 
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means of punishment against it in sanction of its criminal wrongdoing—
consider, again, the German context where, on some interpretations, the 
state may sometimes be constitutionally compelled to permit it.  
 
 Moreover, states’ claims to authority may not always be legitimate.  
Joseph Raz famously frames the issue as follows: a purported authority’s 
directives are normally justified, and ground a duty to obey, when, by 
complying with them, their addressees are more likely to conform to the 
reasons that otherwise apply to them than if they were to follow their own 
lights (2006: 1014).28 Accordingly, when a state does not permit 
individuals to punish it, yet these individuals have undefeated reasons to 
do so, it may then be that they should not treat it as an authority and 
should not obey it, at least in this specific respect. This point may also be 
articulated in narrower, less perfectionist terms if we assume, arguendo, 
that individuals sometimes have a duty of justice to punish culpable 
wrongdoers—say, to deter further wrongdoing or for reasons of desert. If 
leaving the administration of punishment to the state makes it more likely 
that it will be meted out as it should, then individuals must normally defer 
to it (see further Quong 2011: ch.4). However, when a wrongdoing state 
bars individuals from punishing it as they should, the legitimacy of its 
authority is compromised. In such a case, it is at least arguable that 
individuals ought not to defer to its directives, at least in this respect.  
 
The point is important and can easily be extended to other key 
aspects of the state’s purportedly authoritative administration of the 
criminal process, including public calls to account, adjudication of guilt or 
innocence, and condemnation. Still, let me retain my focus on the more 
contentious issue of punishment with a view to clarifying the argument 
further. Again, according to the line of argument under consideration (see 
also Tadros 2010; Wellman 2009), individuals normally have an 
obligation to defer to an institution’s determinations about whether, how, 
and how much to punish if that institution is likely to do it more justly and 
more effectively—or, if we follow Raz, in better accordance with 
applicable reasons—than if they were to do it themselves. In fact, if it is 
possible to create such an institution in not too costly a way, and if it is 
likely to generate a reasonable degree of compliance, then individuals may 
                                                 
28 For Raz, this condition works in tandem with another one—less central here—
according to which, to be legitimate and generate a duty to obey, authority must also be 





well have a duty to create one. It does not matter that this institution is 
imperfectly just or impartial. Only a greater likelihood of justice and 
effectiveness—or, following Raz, of compliance with reasons—matters. 
This reasoning helps us see why it is that punishment of the state by 
individuals must remain a last resort, as well as what this proviso may 
entail. Yet, it also shows that the claim that individual punishment is 
always illegitimate is much too strong. When a state, including its courts, 
engages in egregious legal wrongdoing, the question may be asked 
whether it, or international institutions, are more likely to provide fair and 
effective criminal accountability than if individuals were to “take the law 
in their own hands.” Insofar as the answer is no, it is arguable that the 
possibility of legitimate popular punishment of the state should not be 
ruled out ipso facto.29 I say “arguable,” since I have not yet examined 
what, if anything, makes it appropriate to punish the state, and what kinds 
of state punishments may be permissible.  
 
Before I say anything about this, though, let me briefly address one 
more prominent objection to popular forms of punishment. For some, 
justice requires that the same entity that sets criminal prohibitions be the 
one to determine whether they have been breached and how they should 
be sanctioned, as well as the one to execute the said sanctions (see 
especially Harel 2008; Harel 2011). Put differently, the claim is that 
justice demands that all opportunities for inappropriate and erroneous 
second-guessing by third parties be ruled out of the criminal process. 
Here, one may counter that, since the state cannot but act through 
individuals, the possibility of second-guessing can hardly be ruled out. But 
let us assume that it can, at least in principle. At first glance, this objection 
seems to stand in the way of popular punishment of the state. But does it 
really? I do not think so. First, in cases in which states perpetrate 
egregious criminal wrongs and fail to hold themselves to account, there 
may be no other way for justice to be effected than through popular means 
(assuming, for the sake of argument, the absence of suitable international 
response). Such situations differ significantly from cases, at which this 
objection is otherwise aimed, in which states decide to outsource the 
                                                 
29 A similar reasoning may be invoked to defend the legitimacy of state punishment by 
non-state, or sub-state, corporate agents. I bracket here the further question of when 
individuals should defer to these other agents, although, once again, the service 
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execution of their punishment of individual criminals to other ordinary 
individuals. That is, ordinary individuals faced with state wrongdoing may 
be the only ones in a position to do anything about it or, at least, the only 
ones able to hold the state to account and punish it with any semblance of 
independence. Indeed, whereas the executive might, for example, be 
punished by means of a fine authorized by the legislature, which the courts 
then direct to be paid at least in part to aggrieved parties,30 or while the 
federal government may punish a provincial one, the state as a whole 
generally controls domestic institutional means of criminal punishment. 
 
Now, even if, arguendo, it is true that justice absolutely requires 
that the source of criminal prohibitions also administer the sanctions for 
their violation, the objection does not necessarily bite against popular state 
punishments. To see why, let us revert to our discussion of authority. 
Some theorists describe the kinds of situations in which the purported 
authority of the state is illegitimate and rejected by its addressees as 
“states of nature,” in which “political authority is absent” (Ristroph 2009: 
614-615). Such states of nature are sometimes said to be all-
encompassing, or specific to given purported exercises of state authority 
and given individuals. A better way of characterizing some such 
circumstances, though, is not as situations in which “political authority is 
absent,” but as situations in which deficiencies in the state’s authority 
correspond, however temporarily and specifically, to ordinary individuals 
asserting that authority. In other words, in some situations in which states 
are unwilling to hold themselves to account for egregious legal 
wrongdoing, and all better institutional processes have been exhausted, 
individuals may claim the authority to bring about such accountability 
themselves. In the case of state constitutional wrongdoing, it may then be 
possible to conceive of this purported popular authority as the very source, 
or constituent authority, that framed the state’s legal duties in the first 
place. Of course, such argument might be most obviously available in 
states whose constitutions at least nominally stem from the “the people.” 
However, since all states’ existence rests on a minimum of social 
recognition and acquiescence, it might sometimes be extendable further. 
In this way, the objection could be circumvented in relation to 
constitutional wrongdoing. Given current state-based modes of 
development of international law, the same kind of argument is unlikely to 
                                                 
30 This suggestion is made in dissent in the Australian High Court case of Cain v. Doyle, 




be available for international crimes of state (that find no reflection in 
states’ constitutions). That said, with oft-discussed candidates for such 
crimes like genocide and slavery, I very much doubt that those otherwise 
advocating the objection would insist on extending it to them (at least 
when no better institutional response is available). Once again, the 
problem may be more with the objection itself than with our difficulty in 
meeting it on its own terms. 
 
I have little doubt that many will still cringe at the possibility of 
popular state punishment. For one thing, its effectiveness in the face of 
powerful and potentially repressive state apparatuses may be highly 
uncertain as well as costly (unless, perhaps, a sufficient number of people 
actively support it). Moreover, it may be difficult to ensure that popular 
punishment does not impact the state more than it should, which may be of 
great importance in light of the critical functions the state otherwise 
discharges for its population. As a result, it may also be difficult to avoid 
individual state members, possibly including the very victims of state 
wrongdoing, being detrimentally impacted in significant respects.  
 
In acknowledgement of such challenges, defenders of state 
accountability through forceful popular means tend to limit their claims to 
states’ breaches of duty that are “weighty, crucial and severe” (Honoré 
1988: 51). In other cases, they insist on more discerning constitutional or 
international processes such as judicial proceedings. No doubt, if such 
institutions exist and are disposed to play their role, the move is attractive. 
A judicialized process such as the criminal process as it is liberally 
conceived, with all its substantive, procedural, and evidential guarantees, 
is likely to allow for a much more sensitive handling not only of state 
punishment, but state criminalization as a whole. The problem is that other 
theorists resist the extension of these guarantees to corporate agents and, 
therefore, downright oppose subjecting the state to the criminal process as 
we know it (Thompson 1985; Dan-Cohen 2011).  
 
This resistance primarily finds its roots in the principle of value 
individualism, according to which the worth of a corporate agent like the 
state (and, indeed, of anything else) must ultimately be appreciated in 
terms of its contribution to human (or, at least, sentient) life and its 
quality. The principle is appealing, widely accepted, and entails that the 
good or interests of states are not worth promoting, or defending, for their 
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own sake.31 The argument typically proceeds by emphasizing that the 
protections that the criminal process, in its liberal guises, affords 
individual accused tend to be established for their own good or interests. 
As such, they cannot simply be extended to the state. To be more specific, 
there are those criminal process guarantees, such as guarantees against 
arbitrary imprisonment, whose application to corporate agents hardly 
makes sense in the first place. However, the argument entails that 
corporate agents should also not be afforded guarantees from which they 
could conceivably benefit. For example, a state should not be granted 
justification or excusatory defences grounded in the protection of its 
corporate interests exclusively. Nor should it be afforded guarantees 
against being retried for the same offence, or protections grounded solely 
in corporate privacy with regard to searches, seizures, and other 
investigative techniques.  
 
Yet, the deeper one digs into the list of guarantees typically 
afforded to criminal accused, the more one stumbles upon examples that 
are not as intuitively straightforward. For example, should a corporate 
agent not have the right to present evidence in its own defence, even if it 
holds a crucial piece of information? Should it really be presumed guilty 
whenever charged with a criminal offence, or susceptible to being 
convicted on mere suspicion? Doubt arises here because it is untrue that 
all criminal process protections are grounded in deontological claims 
about the inherent moral worth of those in jeopardy. Many guarantees are 
justified instrumentally, in terms of their consequences—for example, as 
important to truth-seeking and the sorting of actual criminal wrongdoers 
from innocents. In fact, many guarantees of which we first tend to think in 
deontological terms, such as the right to remain silent and not to 
incriminate oneself, are themselves also often defended (at least in part) as 
assisting the search for truth (see e.g. Seidmann and Stein 2000). And 
truth-seeking matters in trials of corporate agents because of the reasons, 
valuable to individuals, for which we may intelligibly criminalize them—
be it to bring about accountability for actual corporate wrongdoing, 
express and communicate blame for it, provide deterrence against it, and 
so forth. The point, more generally put, is that a case may be made for 
affording a wide gamut of substantive, procedural, and evidential 
                                                 
31 The assumption, which I endorse, is that corporate agents do not have whatever 
functional characteristic it is that makes individual human beings distinctively valuable, 




guarantees to corporate accused which rests wholly on their returns for 
individuals. These guarantees may not be extended wholesale, or as a 
matter of course, from the individual-based arrangements of ordinary 
criminal law, but they may still be wide-sweeping, stringent, nuanced, and 
in many ways similar. 
 
This possibility is comforting since, as I noted, depending on the 
mode and quantum of punishment, criminalization of the state may 
sometimes have severe detrimental impacts on its individual members. 
When committed to articulating and upholding sound individuals-oriented 
guarantees for state criminalization, judicial bodies may be well placed to 
provide the discernment and measure that could so easily escape a less 
expert and resourced “popular court.” Of course, like any consequentialist 
rules, the guarantees in question may be defeated when the balance of 
consequences weighs in favour of accountability, condemnation, and 
punishment irrespective of whether they are followed. Such reasoning 
helps explain why it may be that, in some cases, less measured popular 
punishment is still justified. To fully understand why and how that might 
be the case, though, we must, at last, turn to scrutinizing the justifiability 
of punishing the state per se. 
 
D CAN PUNISHING THE STATE BE JUSTIFIED? 
 
According to prominent versions of retributivism, the general justifying 
purpose of punishment is the infliction of the kind and degree of suffering 
that wrongdoers deserve. This way of thinking about justified punishment 
is not easily transferable to state punishment, since claims that states can 
themselves suffer—that is, suffer in ways that are irreducible to the 
suffering of their individual members—are generally metaphysically 
suspect.32 If List and Pettit are right about corporate agency, then given 
some plausible functional claims about states—i.e., they have adequate 
decision-making mechanisms, their decisions can have reasonable 
coherence over time, etc.—there seems to be no principled difficulty in 
ascribing genuine cognitive and action-directing attitudes to them. 
However, this argument does not amount to an argument that the state also 
has the consciousness required to experience phenomenal states such as 
                                                 
32 Still, related claims pervade the literature and are too often left unexamined. For 
example, Tracy Isaacs writes in passing that “If a state warrants punishment for its 




30                                         
 
suffering. One could perhaps try to extend the analysis and claim that 
phenomenal consciousness is also best explained functionally, but I find it 
difficult to imagine how such a claim could be persuasively articulated. In 
other words, there seems to be something more to irreducible sentience 
than mere questions of organizational structure and function—something 
that the state does not have. If I am right about this assumption, then state 
punishment may not be justifiable on such a retributivist ground.  
 
 Then again, punishment is not conceptually welded to the infliction 
of suffering. At bottom, punishment simply consists in the intentional 
infliction of an inconvenient or burdensome deprivation, or setback in 
interests, in response to wrongdoing (or, at least, what is claimed to 
constitute wrongdoing). Suffering is merely one form that such 
inconvenience may take. Thus, expelling a state from an international 
organization—membership in which, let us suppose, benefits it in ways 
that are not easily substitutable—amounts to punishing it, insofar as this 
expulsion is intentionally carried out in response to wrongdoing. Although 
not usually conceived in such terms, the judicial nullification of a 
wrongful piece of legislation—along with, say, more legitimate 
regulations later adopted under it—may also be understood as state 
punishment. Such measures may be so understood insofar as they are 
intended to burden or set back the state in response to its initial 
wrongdoing. If this understanding is correct, then it may be possible to 
justify punishing the state in different retributivist terms. For example, in 
the latter case, it might be argued that since the state sought to expand its 
normative position in a wrongful way, inconvenient measures aimed at 
rolling back such expansion are justifiable. In other words, the proper “eye 
for an eye” response to the state’s wrongful expansion of its legal rights 
may be to frustrate such rights, and setback its designs correspondingly. 
That, some may think, is what the state deserves in a case like this.  
   
 For others, though, theoretical manoeuvres of this sort may 
threaten to stretch the ideas of retributive punishment and desert beyond 
recognition. If that is so, it is perhaps best simply to avoid conducting the 
inquiry in such terms. After all, not only is the infliction of suffering 
unnecessary for punishment, but the concept is also altogether detachable 
from the idea of desert. Undeserved punishments are still punishments, 
just as much as non-suffered punishments are still punishments. This 
realization matters a great deal at the justificatory stage, since, as I 
remarked in the last section, the good and interests of corporate agents like 
the state are not valuable for their own sake. For this reason, the idea of 
31 
 
giving such agents what they deserve tends not to be given more than 
marginal importance in discussions of the justifiability of their 
punishment. Instead, the focus of such discussions tends to be on 
consequence-based grounds of justification that can more easily be related 
to the impact, or value, of corporate punishment for individuals. Oft-
mentioned grounds include deterrence, reform, and incapacitation—or, 
more generally, the suggestion that threatening to punish and actually 
punishing the state may sometimes be justified as a means of preventing 
future state wrongdoing. It is on this general suggestion that I want to 
focus.  
 
 To be able to assess this suggestion, one first needs to get a firmer 
grasp on how the state can be punished. Indeed, the incidence of state 
wrongdoing might be reduced through vicarious punishment (possibly 
involving the suffering) of a state’s population, a particular segment of it, 
or specific individual officials, when these are in a position to influence 
state decision-making. However, what I am interested in here is state 
punishment per se as a component of state criminalization, as opposed to 
hard treatment of third parties for the wrongs of the state. While instances 
of vicarious criminal liability and punishment can be found in the criminal 
law of many jurisdictions, they certainly do not represent the core case of 
criminal treatment. What is more, I believe that genuine state punishment 
is possible.33 It consists in punishment that targets what is irreducibly the 
state’s own—namely, its irreducible beliefs, judgments, action-directing 
attitudes, plans, and possibly also to some extent its constitution.34 The 
question then becomes whether responses to state wrongdoing aimed at 
such irreducible aspects, can ever be justified on the grounds that they 
make it harder for the targeted state to engage in further wrongdoing and, 
possibly, can also dissuade others from doing so. 
 
                                                 
33 Compare: Feinberg (1968: 677), who argues that “Collective liability…differs from 
(other) vicarious liability only in that it involves organized groups and their members.” 
  
34 Some, like Richard Vernon (2011: 304-306), prefer to speak of punishing the state “in 
its political aspect,” a label which, in my view, is at once too narrow and too broad. It is 
too narrow because a state’s beliefs, judgments, and plans which, under some plausible 
description, are not inherently “political” may be at the root of its wrongdoing. It is too 
broad because much political action within the apparatus of the state may be reducible to 
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 This formulation of the question in terms of targeted responses that 
deliberately make it harder for the state to program for certain actions 
allows one to imagine a wide array of means of state punishment. 
Domestically, one could think along such lines of monitored court 
judgments enjoining the state to discontinue and reform some of its 
attitudes, plans, and policies—including those evidenced in relevant 
statutes and regulations—and perhaps also those problematic aspects of its 
constitution that it is in a reasonable position to modify.35 One could also 
conceive in such terms of punitive damages—paid, for example, to the 
victims of state wrongdoing or to outsiders—that would deplete the 
resources of the state and its ability to program for action. At the non-
institutional level, one could also understand as state punishment 
individual acts of civil disobedience against a state’s laws or policies, 
carried out in response to, and with the aim of deterring further, state 
wrongdoing. Here, refusal to pay taxes, defiance of conscription orders, 
public exposure or leaks of state secrets, and internet-based denial-of-
service attacks (DoS) against state agencies may all be cases in point, 
when carried out with the relevant intention. Yet another possibility may 
be forceful popular rebellion, aimed at compelling a change in specific 
state attitudes and programs, restructuring the state in more depth, or 
straight out inflicting the “death penalty” upon it and reconstituting it 
wholesale or dismantling it permanently (i.e., a revolution). While some of 
the same means may be available to international punishers, conquest and 
reconstruction—as in the case of Germany and Japan after World War 
II—as well as more minor restrictions on sovereignty, such as enforced 
no-fly zones, international inspections regimes, well-tailored trade and aid 
embargos, and exclusions from international organizations, are also 
imaginable. 
 
 Insofar as the benefits of such responses to state wrongdoing 
override their costs, they may well be justified. However, for this 
statement to hold true, all things considered, a number of important 
provisos and objections must be addressed. The first is related to value 
individualism. While states’ own interests do not stand in the way of 
invasive responses tailored to obstruct, and sometimes even change and 
                                                 
35 For example, socio-political aspects of a state’s constitution may be easier to modify 
than deeply entrenched legal aspects, the alteration of which may require formal 
constitutional amendments. For the suggestion that structural difficulties in altering a 





monitor, their very judgments, attitudes, and plans, individuals’ interests 
might. Many of the means of punishment outlined above can have 
significantly detrimental side-effects (DSEs) on a state’s individual 
members, possibly including many who have not contributed in any 
relevant way to its wrongdoing and may even themselves be its victims. A 
common response is that, beyond entertaining some limited pleas for 
reductions in sentences due to hardship, criminal justice systems generally 
do not pay much heed to the DSEs of individual punishment—even when 
they are quite significant on the punished individual’s family, dependents, 
and others (French 1984: 189-190). Although accurate, this observation in 
no way entails that DSEs should not be taken into account when 
appraising the justification of a punishment. Perhaps, in many instances of 
individual punishment, such DSEs can be offset by the overall value of 
punishment to the punished and society at large. Even if correct, though, 
this moral assessment is at best contingent. In many cases where DSEs are 
important, they may well not be fully neutralized. In fact, this argument 
entails even less that side-effects have no moral bearing for corporate 
punishment, which cannot be justified otherwise than in terms of its value 
for others—namely, individuals—some of whom may be the very same 
ones on whom DSEs fall.  
 
 This thought can be fleshed out by means of examples. State 
punishment through fines or forceful methods, such as rebellion and, 
possibly, war, may have momentous DSEs on individuals. Large fines 
may lead states to levy heavy additional taxes from their populations and 
to cut back on important services they would otherwise provide them, thus 
affecting negatively their standard of living. Resort to force on a wide 
scale may result in many individuals indiscriminately being harmed, and 
possibly even killed. No one, I take it, would want to argue that such 
setbacks in individual interests, possibly involving important infringement 
of individual rights, do not matter morally. Thus, if instances of state 
punishment that have DSEs on individuals are to be permissible, this 
permissibility needs to be argued for.  
 
Commonly-defended grounds for at least some moral latitude to let 
DSEs of state punishment fall on state members are individual-specific. 
They comprise individuals’ participation in, or failure to oppose, the 
development of wrongful state attitudes and action plans (Pasternak 2011). 
They also include individuals’ voluntary or semi-voluntary acts of 
identification and association with the state (Pasternak 2012), as well as 
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their causal contribution, however minimal, to state wrongdoing (Tadros 
2012). A major difficulty with such arguments is that they are unlikely to 
apply to everyone who is negatively impacted by a state’s punishment. 
Some of these individuals may have been unable to participate in, or 
oppose, the development of wrongful state attitudes and action plans. 
Others may have deliberately refrained from participating, and done 
whatever they could in opposition. Some may also have resolutely refused 
to identify and associate with the state in the first place (even if they are 
unable to exit it at a reasonable cost to themselves). Others yet may be 
leading reclusive or marginal lives with no relevant causal influence on 
state wrongdoing. In fact, even in situations in which, on the basis of such 
arguments, it would be permissible to let at least some DSEs fall on all 
affected individuals, means of state punishment may not be sufficiently 
discriminating to ensure that no one is unacceptably impacted. While 
forceful rebellion and war may immediately come to mind as incurably 
indiscriminate means, all other conceivable methods of state punishment 
with significant DSEs on individuals must also face the objection. 
 
 One tempting reply might be that the establishment of institutions 
of individual punishment is commonly held to be permissible despite the 
certainty that innocents will be punished, owing to the unavoidable 
possibility of error. According to this possible reply, criminal conviction 
and punishment of some innocents—which may have nothing at all to do 
with criminal wrongdoing—is justified as a DSE of the overwhelmingly 
beneficial institutional practice of convicting and punishing the guilty. No 
doubt, the permissibility of letting such DSEs fall on some innocent 
individuals is at least intuitively plausible. Yet, analogizing criminal 
punishment of individuals and criminal punishment of states in this respect 
is unadvisable. Indeed, considerable resources and systematic efforts are 
generally invested by criminal justice institutions that deal with individual 
suspects to determine, on an individual basis, whether or not they are 
liable to conviction and punishment. As a result, the hope and assumption 
is that, in the vast majority of cases, only those who are liable to 
conviction and punishment will be subjected to them. However, insofar as 
states are targeted and punished as corporate agents in their own right, 
through means—like many of those identified earlier—that are not geared 
(or not as systematically geared) at identifying and avoiding objectionable 
effects on individual members, the worry introduced in the last paragraph 




Is it the case, then, that the only permissible state punishments are 
those that have no meaningful DSEs on individual members, or whose 
DSEs are carefully tailored to match each impacted individual’s 
predicament? This conclusion should not be reached too hastily. Indeed, 
another, less individual-specific, argument  worthy of exploration is that, 
in cases where the state perpetrates wrongdoing in a way that benefits all 
of its members, such benefit may ground a permission to let at least some 
DSEs fall uniformly on all of them. Here, I cannot do justice to all the 
usual objections to this kind of argument. These include the difficulty of 
assessing the said benefit in relation to all affected individuals. They also 
include the challenge of demonstrating that past state wrongdoing 
benefited those who are suffering DSEs of its punishment here and now, 
as well as those who may continue to suffer them in the future. That being 
said, at least one underexplored formulation of the argument, focusing on 
the way in which state wrongdoing is brought about, might be able to 
dodge these objections to a meaningful extent. I introduce it here briefly, 
as a caution against dismissing too quickly the possibility of permissible 
general DSEs of state punishment on individual members. 
 
The argument rests, once again, on Joseph Raz’s thesis about the 
normal justification of authority. There are some decisions that modern 
states are especially well-placed to make, given their social position and 
the kinds of resources at their disposal. Here, I have in mind decisions 
such as how to address intricate societal problems or how to implement 
complex social programs. Insofar as individual state members are more 
likely to comply with reasons by deferring to their state on such matters 
than by following their own lights, then, Raz tells us, the state is normally 
justified in demanding that they defer to it.36 It is justified on the ground 
that it is providing a rational benefit, or in Raz’s words a “service,” to 
these individuals. Thus, in my examples, individuals do not have to 
attempt to solve, by themselves, the kind of social problems or 
implementation conundrums mentioned. When a state, whose authority is 
justified in this way, is inexcusably mistaken in its judgment and ends up 
perpetrating criminal wrongdoing, it may then be unfair to expect it, 
                                                 
36 As noted in the previous section, Raz also insists that, to be legitimate, an authority 
must not excessively curtail individuals’ personal autonomy, or independence. Recall 
also that Raz’s thesis may be rearticulated in non-perfectionist terms, insofar as 
individuals have duties to deal with the matters in question, and are likely to deal with 
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perhaps along with those who significantly contributed to its decision-
making, to handle the costs of punishment in a self-contained way. In 
other words, the state’s population writ large may be legitimately expected 
to absorb some of these costs, as recipients of a service which, although 
more likely to benefit them, backfired in a given instance.   
 
 According to this argument, permissible DSEs still ought to be 
calculated in some proportion to the benefit individually received, which, 
again, may rule out more harmful and indiscriminate forms of state 
punishment. However, since states can be normally justified in making 
certain kinds of decisions across people and time, the argument may 
helpfully apply to entire state populations, over time. It may even apply to 
victims of state wrongdoing who otherwise benefit from the state’s 
rational service.37 The argument also has the advantage of presenting a 
defined benefit with which to contend. No doubt, the argument has its 
limitations. It is a piecemeal argument that only applies to certain cases of 
wrongdoing, by certain states. For example, states whose authority is 
generally unjustified must be ruled out of its ambit ab initio. Yet, its 
plausibility (more argument would be needed to establish its success) 
should lead one to refrain from dismissing too rapidly the possibility of 
permissible state punishments with DSEs on all individual state 
members.38 Of course, there will always also remain possible cases of 
state wrongdoing that are so “clear, weighty, and crucial” that they 
warrant punishment despite radical DSEs on some individuals. Some de 
minimis DSEs on individuals may also be generally permissible. What I 
am suggesting here is that the permissibility of state punishment with 
widespread DSEs can extend beyond these two extremes. 
 
                                                 
37 Here, I am not denying that other victims-related arguments based on other benefits of 
state wrongdoing or state punishment for them, or on their possible consent to suffering 
the latter’s detrimental side-effects, are also possible. I am only pinpointing an important 
strength of the argument under consideration. 
 
38 Anna Stilz (2011) has recently developed an argument of a similar form. According to 
Stilz, a state’s authority is generally justified, and benefits state members across all 
matters, when the state passes the minimal threshold of “reasonably interpreting” its 
members’ “basic right.” This generalized threshold is ambiguous—perhaps especially 
when framed, as Stilz does, as a threshold of “necessary hypothetical authorization,” 
which may only be passed by “democratic legal states.” As I have tried to show through 
the lens of Raz’s thesis about the normal justification of authority, a clearer and more 




 Another objection to state punishment as I have been conceiving it 
so far is that, since states do not have any matter or energy beyond that 
provided by their individual members, it is really impossible to punish the 
former without punishing the latter. I have already signalled my 
reservations about this objection, since I believe punishing the state 
involves deliberately targeting its irreducible aspects. At times, it may be 
possible to punish it with virtually no DSEs on individuals and, at others, 
with only permissible ones. It is likely true, though, that some means of 
state punishment could be mixed, and involve deliberately targeting 
individuals alongside irreducible aspects of the state. For example, it is in 
the nature of many just wars and rebellions that they target soldiers and 
other state officials, alongside the structure of the state and its irreducible 
attitudes and action plans. Such intentional hard treatment of individuals 
likely brings with it its own additional set of moral constraints, with which 
a full account of the permissibility of these modes of punishment would 
have to contend.39 I can only flag this complication in passing, while 
stressing that some conceivable means of state punishment will not share 
this feature. Think, for example, of various forms of civil disobedience 
targeted at specific laws or policies, of monitored injunctions for the state 
to reform itself in specific ways, or of well-tailored embargoes against 
repressive policies (such as bans on arms trading).  
 
 Changing register slightly, one may wonder why I insist on 
discussing the kinds of state treatment listed above under the rubric of 
state punishment. Whereas, conceptually speaking, punishment is a 
response to what is at least claimed to be wrongdoing, many of the forms 
of inconvenient treatment discussed may be justified on consequential 
grounds that have no connection whatsoever with state wrongdoing. For 
example, the prevention of state-caused harm may sometimes provide a 
sufficient justification for such treatments, whether or not this harm is 
wrongfully brought about. I have no qualms about conceding this point. 
States are not valuable for their own sake, and a variety of considerations 
may justify individuals in seeking to alter a state’s attitudes, plans, and 
make-up through comparable means. However, that the forms of state 
treatment discussed be portrayed and understood as punishment when they 
are undertaken in response to culpable wrongdoing—and especially for 
                                                 
39 For a good starting point on the moral distinction between intentional harm and 
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my purposes, criminal wrongdoing—matters a great deal. In fact, it may 
even add to their justification.  
 
 The justification of criminalization in both its condemnatory and 
punitive aspects at least partly rests on its expressive value. Christopher 
Bennett (2008) powerfully conveys this idea when he describes the 
practice as a symbolic ritual. That is, public condemnation and 
inconvenient treatment, understood as punishment, are imbued with social 
meaning. They constitute what we have come to understand and accept as 
the appropriate response to unjustified and unexcused criminal 
wrongdoing. For some, this response is symbolically valuable in that it 
expresses fitting attitudes of resentment and indignation, and judgments of 
disapproval and disapprobation, for the criminal’s conduct (Feinberg 
1970: 98). This point is sometimes sharpened by emphasizing that 
condemnation and punishment inflict, or are relevantly understood as 
inflicting, an “expressive defeat” on the wrongdoer, thus reaffirming the 
equal moral worth of the victim which the wrongdoer had implicitly or 
explicitly denied (Hampton 1990: 122-130). Of course, some crimes are 
victimless, and a more general formulation of the point according to which 
such response “adequately symbolises the effect of what the wrongdoer 
has done on her [own] standing” (in the relevant normative community) 
may be more apposite (Bennett 2008: 194). Irrespective of its exact 
articulation, though, the overall claim is powerful. The symbolism of 
condemnation and punishment for criminal wrongdoing bears important 
value for individuals, which in turn contributes to the justification of the 
practice. 
 
 Is this argument, specifically developed with condemnation and 
punishment of individual criminals in mind, really transferable to 
criminalization of the state? Some, like Joel Feinberg, seem to doubt it, 
and insist on characterizing criminalization as a means for the state to 
disavow conduct that is not its own and that it does not condone (1970: 
101-102). This insistence flies in the face of the observation, made earlier, 
that a state may conceivably blame and punish itself for its own criminal 
wrongdoing. It also ignores the fact that other entities and individuals may 
be legitimately positioned, both internationally and domestically, to hold 
states to account criminally. The reluctance exhibited by Feinberg is 
characteristic of theories of domestic individual criminalization that 
conceive of the state as sitting above, or as embodying or representing, 
those whose values ought to determine what counts as criminal 
wrongdoing, and in whose name criminalization ought to take place. In 
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these theories, such special standing for the state in relation to the relevant 
normative community of individuals—be it defined in political or moral 
terms—plays a large role in explaining why it is an appropriate condemner 
and punisher. No doubt, this path of inquiry has been fruitful and yielded 
many important insights in the development of criminal law theory. Still, 
one may wonder why, if the state is not only a possible condemner and 
punisher, but also a potential criminal wrongdoer, it should not also be 
theorized as such. Throughout this article, I have sought to start building a 
case that it should be.  
 
 Thinking of the state as a wrongdoer may even have its rightful 
place within the kinds of theories discussed. Modern states, I suggested, 
can be agents proper. As List and Pettit go on to insist, they might even 
appropriately be described as persons, insofar as “person” is understood in 
the performative sense of an agent capable of appropriately responding to 
reasons and performing in the space of obligations. In their own words, 
“persons, natural or corporate, are distinguished by the fact that they can 
enter a system of obligations recognized in common with others, and limit 
their influence on one another to that permitted within the terms of that 
system” (List and Pettit 2011: 178). Understood in this light, states lose 
much of their aura of unassailable distinctiveness and superiority. They 
can be thought of as genuine members of normative communities—moral, 
political, or legal—along with their individual members and other persons 
(including other corporate persons). It then becomes possible to treat them 
as responsible agents that can share the values of relevant communities, 
understand the expressive meaning of condemnation and punishment, and 
be expected to respond appropriately. Thus, not only may culpable 
wrongdoing states be perfectly intelligible targets for condemnatory and 
punitive expression, they may also have what it takes to make that 
expression their own, and to take appropriate steps to reform themselves, 
make amends, and avoid similar wrongdoing in the future.40 Once again, I 
am not claiming here that states should be thought of as having equal 
moral value to individuals, or that they should have equal rights. My claim 
is simply that they may be engaged appropriately as subjects of criminal 
law, whose criminalization can be valuable, and justified, because of a 
                                                 
40 Such a way of thinking about the state may then open up new vistas for so-called 
communicative theories of criminalization, otherwise defended as modified versions of 
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number of important consequential and symbolic considerations (as well 
as, perhaps, some more tangential retributive ones).  
 
E CONCLUSION: OF NEW VISTAS, ALTERNATIVES,  
FICTIONS, AND POLITICS 
 
I ended the last section by suggesting that thinking about states as possible 
criminal wrongdoers may open up new vistas for criminal law theory. 
Such vistas are not entirely new. There is a long tradition of thinking about 
the importance of curtailing state action through the rule of domestic and 
international law. Furthermore, as I suggested in the introduction, the 
willingness to conceive of states as genuine moral wrongdoers is also 
making its way, albeit timorously, into criminal law theory circles. In this 
article, I have sought to advance these discussions, by inviting reflection 
about regulation of state wrongdoing through criminal law itself. I mostly 
focused on the case of domestic state criminalization, as I consider that the 
international law case is more straightforward, and that most of the major 
objections it faces also arise in some form or another domestically.41 To be 
sure, many questions remain to be addressed, even at the domestic level. 
For example, what specific kinds of state behaviour ought to be 
criminalized, and what exactly differentiates state crimes from other forms 
of legal regulation of state conduct? Given the state’s regular resort to 
coercion as a means of discharging many of its central functions—it is, 
after all, the quintessential agent of criminal law—what kinds of 
justifications and excuses should be available to it?42 Moreover, how do 
wrongdoing by the state, its discrete corporate organs, as well as its 
individual officials and ordinary members relate to each other precisely? 
                                                 
41 Unsurprisingly, the few recent theoretical discussions of state criminalization focus 
exclusively on international law. See e.g. Luban (2011) and Lang Jr. (2007). 
 
42 As John Gardner once suggested, the state can be a wrongdoing agent that perpetrates 
murders or is complicit in murder, robs or is complicit in robbery, blackmails or is 
complicit in blackmail. As such, it “too needs to justify its coercive activities in moral 
terms. Satisfying the harm principle and rule of law are necessary but insufficient 
conditions of this. The state is also bound, even in its exercises of authority and its uses 
of coercion, by the general principles of morality that bind us all” (Gardner 2007: 2628). 
I believe, although I cannot argue here, that given the social role of the modern state, and 
its typical de facto authority and greater resources, such general principles may make 
even greater demands on it. Consequently, many exculpatory defenses available to it may 





At the international level more specifically, who may legitimately hold a 
state to account criminally and punish it? Can other individual states, 
foreign groups of victims, or their allies ever have the standing to do so, or 
must the response be institutional and multilateral? Insofar as the most 
appropriate approach is institutional, what features should the relevant 
institutions and their processes have? And at both levels, to what extent 
can the concepts, principles, and doctrines applicable to the 
criminalization of individuals be appropriately transferred to the case of 
state criminalization? While I provocatively sought to start building a 
plausible case for state criminalization here, the topic no doubt remains 
rich in theoretical ramifications that are yet to be examined.  
 
Even then, I could not conclude without briefly highlighting yet 
another important set of puzzles. Criminalization is a blunt practice. 
Assuming, as I do, that there will be times when no other social objectives 
defeat those of domestic state criminalization, there will still remain a 
question about alternatives. Indeed, when less draconian options are 
available to achieve the same legitimate objectives, then criminalization 
should arguably yield to them. What such alternatives might there be? 
Despite various suggestions to the contrary, I do not think “civil” liability 
and compensation, reparations, reconciliation schemes, truth commissions, 
and public inquiries fulfill the same functions, or at least not completely. 
While all may shed some light on state wrongdoing, and possibly even 
lead to state reform, condemnation and punishment paradigmatically fall 
outside their remit.43 This point is generally also thought to extend to 
other, more technical, ways of bringing about structural and attitudinal 
changes in states, including the judicial invalidation of legally 
unauthorized state action. In fact, even systematic criminalization (or, 
similarly, appropriate political castigation) of all individual wrongdoers 
acting within the architecture of the state does not quite cut it. It does not, 
because, as I suggested repeatedly, there may often be more to the state 
than the sum of its individual parts. That is, states may culpably perpetrate 
wrongs of which no individual is guilty, either because all individuals 
have some kind of defence, or because the grounds for state 
criminalization are not the same as for individuals. A similar line of 
argument holds, I suggested, between the state and its subsidiary corporate 
                                                 
43 In fact, many argue that condemnation and punishment should fall outside their remit, 
given the types of institutional processes that they are (Duff 2008; Gardner 2005; Van 
Harten 2003). 
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organs. Thus, criminalization of the state has the distinctive advantage of 
standing in the way of shortfalls of criminalization, which could, in turn, 
deprive individuals of its warranted mix of targeted symbolism and 
consequences. 
 
Indeed, even when the state does not meet the requirements of 
irreducible corporate agency, the shortfall argument may still be invoked 
to ground fictions of state criminality. I hinted at this additional possibility 
throughout, mentioning that expressive, consequential, and fairness-based 
considerations may sometimes justify it. While a fuller discussion of this 
other paradigm of state criminalization will have to await another 
occasion, it seems important not to ignore it both because of its plausible 
overlap with, and complement to, the real agency paradigm, and because 
of its educational potential. With respect to the latter, while in many 
jurisdictions “the state” or “commonwealth” is a person known to law, in 
others, the law’s imagination is limited to sub-state agents such as the 
Crown and its individual officials. In fact, even in international law where 
states are the chief legal subjects, the state is often understood to be 
primarily identifiable through rules fictionally attributing to it certain acts 
of others. This fictional orientation remains predominant in international 
law even if, when taken together, many such rules come very close to 
recognizing the state as an agent proper (including in its domestic 
extralegal instantiations) (see further Crawford 2001: Arts 2-11). Thus, 
allowing the possibility of justified fictions of state criminality presents an 
opportunity to help lawmakers come to terms both with the existence of 
the state qua person, and the conceivability of its criminalization.44  
 
How much politics can really countenance the development of 
state criminalization properly so called, or even the criminalization of 
subsidiary corporate state organs such as governments and their agencies, 
is another question. If scarce contemporary discussions of the issue are 
any indication, it is unlikely to top national (or international) agendas any 
time soon. This is not to say that conditions may never be ripe. The idea 
                                                 
44 List and Pettit present a developmental rationale for fictional state responsibility that 
goes even further. According to them, it may sometimes be permissible to hold states that 
are not agents fictionally responsible, to make it clear to their members that, unless they 
develop routines for keeping their state in check (possibly turning it into an agent proper), 
they will suffer costs. Indeed, they add, this developmental rationale for ascribing group 
responsibility fictionally “is all the more powerful if the ascription of guilt is attended by 




was certainly advocated forcefully at various points since the World Wars, 
and it appears in limited or derivative ways in some domestic 
constitutional frameworks and criminal codes, as well as in international 
documents like the Rome Statute. From time to time, it also resurfaces in 
public discourse after evidence of state-sanctioned aggressions, 
assassinations, torture, and other scandalous forms of state complicity in 
wrongdoing comes to light. Only time will tell if state crimes, explicitly 
identified as such, ever come to form a normal part of the domestic and 
international norms of state accountability. Only experience will show if 
justified criminal, or criminal-like, processes and punishments can steadily 
emerge and reliably stand up to politics and other social pressures in 
response to state wrongdoing. While we wait and watch, though, we can 
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